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ABSTRACT
Implementations of network protocols are often prone to vulner-
abilities caused by developers’ mistakes when accessing memory
regions and dealing with arithmetic operations. Finding practical
approaches for checking the security of network protocol imple-
mentations has proven to be a challenging problem. The main
reason is that the protocol software state-space is too large to be
explored. Here we propose a novel verification approach that com-
bines fuzzing with symbolic execution to verify intricate properties
in network protocol implementations. We use fuzzing for an ini-
tial exploration of the network protocol, while symbolic execution
explores both the program paths and protocol states, which were
uncovered by fuzzing. From this combination, we automatically
generate high-coverage test input packets for a network protocol
implementation. We surveyed various approaches based on fuzzing
and symbolic execution to understand how these techniques can be
effectively combined and then choose a suitable tool to develop fur-
ther our model on top of it. In our preliminary evaluation, we used
ESBMC, Map2Check, and KLEE as software verifiers and SPIKE
as fuzzer to check their suitability to verify our network proto-
col implementations. Our experimental results show that ESBMC
can be further developed within our verification framework called
FuSeBMC, to efficiently and effectively detect intricate security
vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most challenging and error-prone tasks is the imple-
mentation of network protocols. When implementing network pro-
tocols, software bugs introduced during their implementation can
lead to devastating security vulnerabilities [28]. For example, a
stack-based buffer overflow in Sami FTP Server 2.0.1 allowed re-
mote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long USER command,
which triggered a buffer overflow when visualizing the log [18].
Vulnerabilities exist in network protocol implementations, such
as DNS, TCP, and FTP [24]. These vulnerabilities are hard to be
detected by protocol formal verification methods since the protocol
software state-space is too large to explore [24]. The validation of
possible events such as packet access, packet loss, and timeout must
be checked during the protocol implementation [14].
There exist many reasons to verify network protocol implementa-
tions. First, the state-space exploration of protocol implementations
is often large [14]. Second, finding semantic errors need a machine-
readable specification [14] to check whether the implementation
meets the specification automatically. Third, many bugs manifest
themselves only after a long period of operation [14]. Therefore,
these problems have attracted the attention of many researchers
to develop automated tools to check for errors in network proto-
cols. However, to understand the problems of network protocol
implementations and motivate research towards new techniques
for detecting implementation errors, we need to consider real exam-
ples that show how ambiguities in protocol specifications can cause
various flaws and interoperability problems during the protocol
implementation. Network protocols are described in specifications
that contain the information required to produce a protocol imple-
mentation. Protocol specifications are usually written in informal
languages, and therefore may be vague, incomplete, or fail to ad-
dress important properties of the protocol implementation. These
specifications are referred to by multiple manufacturers and lead to
different protocol implementations. A misinterpretation of a spec-
ification by one of the manufacturers can cause implementation
errors. Many errors are not detected until the service is in real use.
Therefore, there exists a strong need for developing a verification
method to reduce such errors made by programmers, which cause
security vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations.
Techniques such as fuzzing [20], symbolic execution [16], static
code analysis [12], and taint tracking [22] are the most common
techniques to detect security vulnerabilities in network protocol
implementations. Here we propose a novel method that combines
fuzzing and symbolic execution to detect security vulnerabilities
in network protocol implementations. We use two approaches for
symbolically verifying network protocol implementations. One
based on path exploration, i.e., when a branch is found, a symbolic
executor explores each branch separately, thereby making a copy of
the current state. Another one based on bounded model checking
(BMC), i.e., BMC evaluates both branch sides andmerges states after
that branch. We also exploit fuzzing to produce random inputs to lo-
cate security vulnerabilities in network protocols. On the one hand,
fuzzing is generally unable to create various inputs that exercise all
paths in the network protocol implementation. On the other hand,
symbolic execution may also not achieve high path-coverage be-
cause of the state-space explosion problem. Consequently, fuzzing
and symbolic execution by themselves often cannot reach the deep
states of the network protocol implementation. As a consequence,
the vulnerabilities related to the deep states cannot be identified and
detected by these techniques. Therefore, a hybrid approach involv-
ing fuzzing and symbolic execution may achieve better function
coverage than fuzzing or symbolic execution in isolation.
Here we combine fuzzing and symbolic execution techniques in
an unprecedented manner to exploit the process of detecting secu-
rity vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations. In par-
ticular, our verification model requires enhancements to symbolic
execution so that it can efficiently explore various network proto-
col implementations to avoid the path explosion problem. These
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enhancements need to provide both broad and deep exploration of
the state-space, thus resulting in high source code coverage of the
network protocol implementations. Our preliminary study provides
a detailed survey and taxonomy on fuzzing and symbolic execution
for verifying network protocol implementations. Thus, we make
two significant contributions. First, we describe a novel verification
technique that uses symbolic execution combined with fuzzing to
generate automatically high-coverage test packets from the network
protocol implementations. We detect various generic implementa-
tion errors, e.g., invalid memory access or division-by-zero, which
can cause the implementation of the network protocol to crash.
We use fuzzing for an initial exploration of the network protocol
and then apply symbolic execution to generate high-coverage test
packets for network protocol implementations automatically. Sec-
ond, our experimental results show that ESBMC [19] can be further
developed to detect security vulnerabilities in network protocols.
In particular, ESBMC was able to detect a security vulnerability
targeted at the FTP implementation faster than other existing tools
such as Map2check [17], KLEE [7], and SPIKE [1].
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Network Protocol
A network can be defined as a group of entities that are intercon-
nected with communication technologies and allow the exchange of
information [3]. The communicating entities require an agreement
for exchanging information, and these agreements are known as
network protocols. The messages exchanged by these entities are re-
ferred to as packets. A sequence of packets is called a packet stream.
Information related to methods, behavior, and packet formats are
described in documents when designing a network protocol [24];
these documents form the protocol specification, which is routinely
referenced by developers of a protocol implementation. Implemen-
tations of network protocols are referred to as network daemons
in UNIX and other operating systems. When requirements of a
protocol P are specified, these requirements are described in the
protocol specification S , and the specification is implemented in I .
For example, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is a standard network pro-
tocol used for the transfer of computer files between a client and a
server on a computer network [31]; it is described in several Request
For Comments (RFC) documents that form the protocol specifica-
tion. Several implementations of the specification exist, such as
FileZilla (Windows) and Pure-FTPd (Unix). FTP is an application-
level protocol used on (TCP/IP) networks for file exchange. The
FTP is implemented as follows. First, a client uses port 21 to con-
nect to the server. The client requests are sent in ASCII using this
socket. A new socket is opened on port 20 with the server when the
client requests to transfer data. Client requests mostly consist of a
four-letter message type followed by the actual message. The server
responses are in ASCII, where the first three digits correspond to
a status code followed by an optional message. We use the FTP
implementation as our case study to evaluate our prototype.
2.2 Fuzzing
Fuzzing is a software testing technique to exploit vulnerabilities in
software systems [21]. Fuzzing prepares random or semi-random
inputs to the target network protocol. Critical security flawsmost of-
ten occur because program inputs are not adequately checked [29].
Since these inputs are random, their unexpected and improper ap-
pearance in a target network protocol is highly probable. If the
target network protocol does not reject these improper inputs, it
will hang or crash during fuzz testing. Fuzzing is a quick and cost-
effective method for locating security vulnerabilities in network
protocols. Software systems that cannot endure fuzzing could po-
tentially lead to security holes. For example, in the FTP protocol,
a network analyzer such as Wireshark extracts specifications of
a network protocol implementation from conversations recorded
between server/client sessions. Once the network protocol specifica-
tions are extracted, the fuzzing engine is loaded with an extendable
list of fuzzing functions. Initially, the fuzzing engine sets its state to
the root of the protocol. It then monitors the input traffic, thereby
making appropriate transitions and applying fuzzing functions.
2.3 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution is widely used to find security vulnerabilities
by analyzing program behavior and generating test cases [9]. Us-
ing symbolic input values instead of concrete input values is the
primary concept of symbolic execution. This method treats the
paths as symbolic constraints and solves the constraints to output
a concrete input as a test case. In terms of network protocols, we
extract the message formats from the protocol specification of the
target network protocol implementation. Then, we use these mes-
sage formats to construct a concrete packet, which is used to mark
the ID field of this packet as symbolic values to form a symbolic
packet. After that, we invoke the symbolic execution engine to ex-
plore possible paths of the protocol program using two approaches:
path-based symbolic execution and BMC.
2.4 Challenges in Verifying Network Protocols
There exist many challenges to verify network protocols. First, the
network protocol size is large and complicated since it involves
different communicating entities. Second, testing and verification
is a long process in which many errors appear only after a long
period of operation. Avoiding the path explosion is one of the most
difficult challenges we may face when we use a symbolic execution
engine. The possible number of execution paths considered is so
large, which only a small part of the program state-space is explored.
Lastly, if we test a protocol in a virtual environment is not the same
as testing it in a real environment. Thus, detecting vulnerabilities in
network protocols in the real-world is a challenge, which deserves
specialized verification approaches to ensure behavior correctness.
3 FINDING VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK
PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATIONS
Network protocol implementations are often prone to vulnera-
bilities caused by the developer mistakes, which include: buffer
overflow, which is a situation where a running program attempts
to write data outside the memory buffer, which is not intended to
store this data [6]; memory leak, which occurs when programmers
create a memory in a heap and forget to delete it [33]; denial-of-
service attack (DoS), which is a security event that occurs when an
attacker prevents legitimate users from accessing specific computer
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systems, devices, services, or other IT resources [27]. As an exam-
ple, a vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) module
of Cisco IOS XE Software Releases 16.6.1 and 16.6.2 could allow an
unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a memory leak, which
could lead to a DoS condition [10].
3.1 FuSeBMC for detecting security
vulnerabilities
After searching for tools that combine fuzzing and symbolic exe-
cution, we have found just one promising tool: Driller [26]. There
exist other methods that claim to combine fuzzing and symbolic
execution, but we have not found any tool implementation avail-
able [34]. Given the current knowledge in software verification and
testing, there exists no tool that has been developed in the field of
network protocols, which require dealing with packets in the net-
work is one of the challenges that were not addressed by tools that
integrate the two technologies. However, some tools that do not
combine the two technologies faced some problems such as path
explosion or achieved low coverage. Therefore, we propose a novel
approach called FuSeBMC for detecting security vulnerabilities in
network protocol implementations using fuzzing and symbolic ex-
ecution. The main idea is to generate a set of test input packets
using fuzzing to explore the state-space initially. These test inputs
will guide the symbolic execution and BMC engines to explore the
parts that fuzzing could not reach. In other words, it will legalize
the scanning process and avoid problems such as code explosion.
Then, use symbolic execution and BMC to achieve high-code cover-
age and replay them against an implementation, thereby observing
potential violations of rules derived from the protocol specification.
We devise an exploration method that achieves broad and in-depth
exploration of the state-space of a target implementation.
Our prototype is illustrated in Fig. 1. There exist five steps to
verify network protocol implementation. First, the protocol spec-
ification analyzer produces the concrete packet. We use here the
Wireshark [11] to capture the packet that will be sent between the
client and the FTP server. Second, our prototype employs American
Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [32], which is a tool that uses initial test-cases and
genetic mutations to generate new test cases. AFL works with the
target software that accepts inputs from the standard input or a file.
We fuzz the software for exploring the functions. Then, we compute
the function coverage achieved by the fuzzer. Third, we mark the
input packet as a symbolic packet that would result in too many
paths, and most of these paths would not increase code coverage
because they would refer to invalid packets, which are usually dis-
carded by an implementation. Typically a network packet consists
of multiple fields, which are part of the packet header. Most protocol
implementations contain logic for handling these fields. Therefore,
FuSeBMC uses these fields as symbolic variables instead of entire
input packets. Fourth, we use path-based symbolic execution and
BMC to reach those functions that were uncovered by the fuzzer.
Because of an initial exploratory phase with fuzzer, a symbolic
execution engine becomes capable of excluding the functions that
can be reached quickly and, hence, more time can be allocated to
intricate and deep functions. Lastly, the symbolic marker converts
the concrete packet to a symbolic packet by marking some bytes of
the packet as symbolic values.
Figure 1: FuSeBMC Verification Framework.
Our FuSeBMC prototype builds on top of Map2Check [17] as a
path-based symbolic execution engine combined with fuzzing and
ESBMC [19] as a state-of-the-art BMC engine. Both tools explore
all program paths of the network protocol software and produce
a concrete packet while the memory monitor module reports and
records the crashes. For example, if the user provides an instruction
to mark the flags field as symbolic, our prototype replaces the
concrete value of this field within the packet with symbolic values
while keeping the other fields concrete. Thus, FuSeBMC explores
possible execution paths corresponding to the various input packets
having different flags values. At the end of each execution path, it
stores the concrete test packet for a given path on disk.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
4.1 Benchmarks and Setup
When we designed FuSeBMC, we defined two main criteria to hold
in our prototype. First, the ability to detect bugs that can be evalu-
ated by validating network protocol implementations against their
protocol specifications. Second, the low verification time to find
security vulnerabilities when compared to existing approaches. We
conducted experiments on a simple File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
written in the C programming language and a server (Vulnserver),
also written in C that is known to have a security vulnerability.
Although these two C programs are simple implementations of
the FTP protocol, they allow us to evaluate the main elements of
our proposed verification method initially. Additionally, in order
to compare the effects of vulnerability detection, we compared our
method with SPIKE [1], which is based on generational fuzzer for
protocol implementations. In our experiments, we have considered
two sets of properties: “buffer overflow” and “arithmetic overflow”.
The experiments were conducted by hosting two machines, namely,
a host machine and a guest machine. The host machine included an
Intel Core i7 2.9 GHz CPU with 16 GB memory and was running
Ubuntu 14.04. The guest machine was running Windows 10. The
tools were running Ubuntu 14.04 system and the fuzzing tool SPIKE
was running Kali Linux on the host machine as a virtual system.
All benchmarks, tools, and results for this evaluation are available
on a supplementary web page.1
1https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1pD7UW4JWtfKcAXzd2ea9Ma5jL_lJwpED
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Benchmark LOC Tool Result Vulnerability Time
FTP Server 387
ESBMC FALSE Buffer Overflow <1s
KLEE TRUE Not detected 2s
Map2Check UNKNOWN Not detected 2s
Vulnserver 248
ESBMC FALSE Buffer Overflow <1s
SPIKE Crashed Buffer Overflow 8s
KLEE FALSE Buffer Overflow 2s
Map2Check UNKNOWN Not detected <1s
Table 1: Results of the FTP server and Vulnserver experi-
ments.
4.2 Objectives
The main goal of this evaluation is to check the performance and
suitability of these tools ESBMC [13], KLEE [7], andMap2Check [17]
to be further developed to detect security vulnerabilities in real-
world network protocol implementation within FuSeBMC. Our ex-
perimental evaluation aims to answer two experimental goals:
EG1 (vulnerability detection)Are ESBMC, KLEE andMap2Check
able to detect security vulnerabilities in real-world network
protocol implementations?
EG2 (witness validation) Are ESBMC, KLEE and Map2Check
able to provide further evidence of the detected security
vulnerabilities?
4.3 Results
We applied ESBMC, KLEE, andMap2Check to the simple FTP server
implementations. Table 1 shows our experimental results. ESBMC
has found an array-bounds violation, KLEE could not find any prop-
erty violation, while Map2check provided the result “UNKNOWN”.
These results partially answer EG1, given that only ESBMC can
detect security vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations.
Additional implementation effort would be needed to adapt KLEE
and Map2Check to verify protocol implementations successfully.
ESBMC, KLEE, Map2Check, and SPIKE were also executed on
the server (Vulnserver), which has a known “buffer overflow” vul-
nerability. Table 1 shows our experimental results. ESBMC, SPIKE,
and KLEE have found the “buffer overflow” vulnerability, while
Map2Check could not detect this vulnerability. Additionally, we
compared these tools in terms of verification time; we have found
that ESBMC can detect the “buffer overflow” vulnerability in less
than one second, while SPIKE took about 8s and KLEE took 2s to
find that vulnerability. We have observed that ESBMC provides a
counterexample as a sequence of stages from the initial to the bad
state to reproduce the vulnerability, which answers EG2.
4.4 Threats to Validity
The main threat to the validity of our experiments is that we per-
formed our evaluation on a simple FTP protocol, to be able to verify
the real-world FTP protocol. However, this assumption may not
make our experiments in the simple FTP protocol work appropri-
ately in the real-world FTP protocol. Additionally, the diversity of
network protocols in terms of protocol specifications and packets
format also affects the accuracy of our experiments. As a result, the
verification process might encounter a great challenge to deal with
these differences in the protocols.
5 LIMITATIONS, RELATEDWORK AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
For more than 20 years, network protocol implementation vul-
nerabilities have been mainly identified by fuzzing [4]. Numerous
instruments do exist, which aimed at network protocol implemen-
tations. SPIKE [1] is a framework that provides an API to aid in
creating fuzzed network protocol implementations. Additionally,
PROTOS [15] produces input parcels shrewdly based on protocol
specifications. Nonetheless, these techniques cannot reach the deep
states of network protocols and do not shape stateful protocols [30].
Symbolic execution has been used to identify security vulner-
abilities and test network protocol. SymbexNet [25] relied on a
symbolic engine tool named KLEE [7] to combine symbolic execu-
tion with rule-based specifications. SymNet [23] has been used to
test the unmodified protocol implementations running on various
operating systems. This SymNet works on the QEMU [5] virtual
machine, and it relies on KLEE as its symbolic engine. Furthermore,
SymNet was designed on top of the S2E [8], which is a platform for
analyzing the properties and behavior of software systems.
The combination of symbolic execution and fuzzing has been
proposed before. Driller [26] is a hybrid vulnerability excavation
tool, which leverages fuzzing and selective concolic execution in
a complementary manner, to find bugs deeply. The authors could
avoid the path explosion inherent in concolic analysis and the in-
completeness of fuzzing by combining the strengths of the two
techniques and mitigate the weaknesses. Driller uses selective con-
colic execution to explore the paths that the Fuzzer engine can easily
reach. However, when the fuzzer engine stuck, Driller generates
symbolic input to explore the remaining paths.
Traditional fuzzing and symbolic execution techniques do not
make full utilization of the protocol state information if they work
independently; because of that, those two techniques have difficul-
ties in reaching the deep states of network protocol implementa-
tions. As a result, the vulnerabilities related to deep states cannot
be identified and detected by these existing methods. Therefore, a
hybrid technique involving fuzzing and symbolic execution may
achieve better function coverage than fuzzing or symbolic execu-
tion in isolation. This paper proposes an approach that helps reduce
gaps in protocol implantation by dealing with network packets. In
particular, we inject symbolic packets into the network so that one
packet can generate various packets that help us test the target
protocol, which makes our approach novel if compared to other
existing approaches such as Driller [26]. In the future, we will de-
velop a fully automated tool based on AFL and ESBMC for detecting
security vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations by
making full utilization of the protocol state information.
Besides, we will use an FSM (Finite-State Machine) model to
guide the symbolic execution. In detail, we will apply the L [2]
online learning algorithm to construct the FSM model. We will
infer the FSM model for the network protocol implementation by
leveraging the L inference algorithm. This approach aims to learn
the state machine by sending network protocol packets and observ-
ing the response packets. Thus, we will handle other vulnerabilities
such as packet loss, timeout, and other semantic errors since the
FSM allows one state active at a time.
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